Southport Murders and Subsequent Riots Cause for Major Policing Reforms

The disorder which took place in July and August 2024 shocked the country, as did the appalling murders of Bebe King, Elsie Dot Stancombe and Alice da Silva Aguiar which preceded it. The events marked the worst disorder since 2011 and were alarming for their violence and targeted nature, with scenes of rioters trying to break into asylum hotels and attacking mosques, community centres and libraries. The level of violence meted out to police officers was deplorable.

This was not protest. Those participating in disorder were not policed more strongly because of their supposed political views but because they were throwing missiles, assaulting police officers and committing arson. It was disgraceful to see the police officers who bore the brunt of this violence being undermined by baseless claims of ‘two-tier policing’.

Thanks to the efforts of thousands of police officers, many of whom suffered serious injuries, the disorder was quelled swiftly, and loss of life was averted. Yet the effectiveness of welfare provisions for individual police officers varied significantly, including some police officers going without water and food for hours, and some injured officers having to convey themselves to hospital. The events also highlighted shortcomings in national policing structures, which meant that individual forces were not always able to access the support they needed, and the Government and police leaders did not always have an accurate picture of what was happening on the ground.

The Government intervened in August to support police forces to respond to the disorder and has since announced a White Paper to deliver major reforms to national policing structures in England. We expect the Government to be ambitious in its proposals to increase the effectiveness of our police forces and support them to rebuild trust.

But the disorder also demonstrated that effective policing relies on a supportive criminal justice system in order to prosecute crimes and imprison offenders. The Government acted in the summer to make sure that this support was in place, but wider problems remain in the courts and in the prison estate. The Government’s ambitions for reducing crime will require better long-term alignment between Home Office policies on crime and policing and those of the Ministry of Justice relating to the criminal justice system.

1Introduction and overview of disorder

Our inquiry

1.The murders of Bebe King, Elsie Dot Stancombe and Alice da Silva Aguiar in Southport and subsequent disorder shocked the whole country, and raised many important issues worthy of inquiry. Shortly after this Committee was established, we decided to conduct a short, focused inquiry into the summer disorder, anticipating that there would be a wider response from Government. We focused specifically on the immediate policing response to the disorder. We received written and oral evidence from 10 police forces to support our inquiry, including some of those who faced the most significant disorder, as well as the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) and several other interested organisations.

2.When this inquiry began, the attack in Southport was still subject to a criminal trial and could not be discussed in Parliament. In choosing to focus on the policing response to the disorder we have not lost sight of the tragic events which preceded it. Our thoughts remain with the families of Bebe King, Elsie Dot Stancombe and Alice da Silva Aguiar, and with all those harmed by the horrific attack in Southport. We will separately continue to scrutinise the Government’s progress in improving the systems which failed to prevent the attack.

The disorder

3.Following the murders of Bebe King, Elsie Dot Stancombe and Alice da Silva Aguiar in Southport on 29 July 2024, a group broke off from a peaceful vigil on the evening of 30 July and gathered outside Southport Mosque. Violence soon broke out, with both police and the mosque targeted.1Over the next week, disorder broke out across several towns and cities including in London, Hartlepool and Aldershot on 31 July; in Sunderland on 2 August; in Hull, Liverpool, Blackpool and Stoke-on-Trent on 3 August; in Rotherham, Tamworth and Middlesbrough on 4 August; and in Plymouth on 5 August.2On Wednesday 7 August the National Police Chiefs’ Council activated its national mobilisation plan, involving the creation of a national strategic reserve of public order officers. While further anti-immigration protests and counter-protests took place across the country, significant disorder was largely avoided after this date.3In total, 246 events (including protests, counter-protests and incidents of disorder) took place, of which 88 were deemed significant, with many of these resulting in disorder.4By 22 January 2025 the disorder had led to 1,804 arrests and 1,072 charges, the majority of which were for serious public order offences.5

4.The nature of disorder varied significantly so this report will not provide a comprehensive account of each incidence. Nonetheless, there were several common features. For example, in many cases violence emerged, sometimes quite rapidly, out of planned protest: South Yorkshire Police, Humberside Police and Staffordshire Police all reported having been notified of a peaceful protest in advance of at least one occurrence of disorder, and Merseyside Police, Humberside Police and the Metropolitan Police (‘the Met’) all reported disorder developing quickly after a protest had gathered.6As well as having to quickly respond to rapidly escalating disorder, police officers were the target of significant violence. Chief Constable Webster of Cleveland Police described the level of violence towards officers as “quite incredible” including arson attacks on police vehicles and missiles being thrown, while Chief Constable Chris Noble of Staffordshire Police described police officers in Tamworth having petrol poured on them in an attempt to set them on fire.7At least 199 officers were assaulted, with 302 injured.8

5.In many cases, aggression and violence was targeted at certain communities. In Southport, as we have stated, disorder broke out after a crowd gathered outside the local mosque. In Rotherham, the police were notified in advance that a protest was planned outside a hotel housing asylum seekers, while in Hull protesters made an unplanned move to do the same.9In Tamworth, Chief Constable Chris Noble described how a hotel housing 135 asylum seekers was targeted by people who were trying to set fire to the hotel.10Similarly, on 31 July in Newton Heath, Greater Manchester, 70 protesters took part in a protest outside a hotel housing asylum seekers, while in Aldershot disorder also took place outside an asylum hotel.11Other targets of violence included a community centre in Hartlepool and Spellow Library in Liverpool.12

6. conclusion
We received no evidence to dispute the characterisation of violent disorder between 30 July and 7 August 2024. Many events held during this period began as protests and remained as such. But while some instances of disorder may have originated as protests, they quickly degenerated into violence. In some cases the chosen sites of protests, such as asylum hotels, were at best controversial and at worst an incitement to violence. Police were left with no choice but to prepare for and provide a strong response. We commend the bravery and professionalism of those officers who worked for long hours in extremely difficult circumstances, many of them suffering injury and other trauma.

Social media mis- and disinformation

7.It has been asserted that mis- and disinformation surrounding the identity of the Southport attacker was a driver of disorder, including by the Home Office who stated that “the online environment played a significant role in inciting violence, with initial speculation and misinformation purporting that the attacker was an asylum seeker.”13In particular, this false rumour that the attacker was an asylum seeker spread rapidly in the days following the murders of Bebe King, Elsie Dot Stancombe and Alice da Silva Aguiar. The AI intelligence company Logically stated that between the false information being published on 29 July and midday the following day, it had received 30,000 mentions on X across 18,000 different accounts.14

8.On 29 July, between 13:07 and 19:18, Merseyside Police published several statements about the Southport attack, confirming certain details including, at 17:25, that a 17-year-old male from Banks had been arrested, and, at 19:18, that the suspect was born in Cardiff. However, crucially, at this point Merseyside Police were unable to publish the identity of the suspect because he was under the age of 18.15In the absence of information confirming the suspect’s identity, misinformation began to circulate online suggesting that the attacker was an asylum seeker named ‘Ali-Al-Shakati’ (an invented name) who had arrived in the UK by boat in 2023. One tweet including this information was posted at 16:49 on 29 July and retweeted several thousand times; the claim was subsequently reported by the artificial news website ‘Channel3Now’ at 17:50, which we have heard allowed the claim to spread further still.16At 12:12 on 30 July, the day of the Southport disorder, Merseyside Police confirmed that the information circulating on social media was false, but were still unable to confirm the suspect’s real identity.17The timeline below details how information was published in the immediate aftermath of the attack.

Timeline of information published after Southport attack

Source material for timeline graphic above:

Timeline box 29 July, 11:47 sourced fromhttps://www.merseyside.police.uk/news/merseyside/news/2024/july/statement-from-chief-constable-serena-kennedy-following-major-incident-in-southport/

Timeline box 29 July, 13:07 sourced fromhttps://www.merseyside.police.uk/news/merseyside/news/2024/july/statement-on-major-incident-in-southport/

Timeline box 29 July, 13:49 sourced fromhttps://news.sky.com/story/southport-attack-misinformation-fuels-far-right-discourse-on-social-media-13188274

Timeline box 29 July, 16:49 sourced fromhttps://news.sky.com/story/southport-attack-misinformation-fuels-far-right-discourse-on-social-media-13188274

Timeline box 29 July, 17:25 sourced fromhttps://www.merseyside.police.uk/news/merseyside/news/2024/july/updated-17-year-old-male-arrested-in-connection-to-southport-incident/

Timeline box 29 July, 17:50 sourced fromhttps://www.logicallyfacts.com/en/analysis/how-dubious-website-channel3now-fueled-misinformation-about-southport-suspect-in-the-u.k

Timeline box 29 July, 19:18 sourced fromhttps://www.merseyside.police.uk/news/merseyside/news/2024/july/statement-from-chief-constable-serena-kennedy-following-major-incident-in-southport

Timeline box 30 July sourced fromhttps://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/138332/pdf/

Timeline box 30 July, 12:12 sourced fromhttps://www.merseyside.police.uk/news/merseyside/news/2024/july/update-on-major-incident-in-southport/

Timeline box 30 July, 19:40 sourced fromhttps://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/15416/html/

Timeline box 30 July, 19:47 sourced fromhttps://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/15416/html/

Timeline box 31 July, 16:43-23:30 sourced fromhttps://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/15416/html/

Timeline box 1 August, 00:16 sourced fromhttps://www.merseyside.police.uk/news/merseyside/news/2024/july/17-year-old-boy-charged-with-murders-and-attempted-murders-in-southport/

Timeline box 1 August sourced fromhttps://committees.parliament.uk/publications/46701/documents/240327/default

Restrictions on the publication of information relating to criminal proceedings

9.As well as possible legal restrictions on the publication of a suspect’s identity, there are restrictions on the publication of material if it “creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced.”18The Crown Prosecution Service’s ‘Publicity and the Criminal Justice System’ protocol sets out how the CPS, working with police and media organisations, aims to balance the principle of open justice “while at the same time balancing the rights of defendants to a fair trial.”19Alongside this guidance, the CPS works directly with the police where necessary to provide advice over what material may risk prejudicing a trial if published.20

10.In the case of the Southport attacker, the CPS told us that there was a significant volume of material that was judged to be potentially relevant to the criminal trial, and therefore could not be published. This included the suspect’s previous conviction and Prevent referrals. The CPS stated that where the police have a legitimate policing purpose to release such material they would listen to their views, but that ultimately would expect the CPS view to prevail, given the importance of not jeopardising a criminal trial.21However, notwithstanding initial legal restrictions in the Southport case, the CPS told us that they were not averse to more factual information about the suspect being published in the immediate aftermath of the attack, as this was not deemed to be potentially prejudicial.22A specific disclosure being considered was the publication of the suspect’s Christian religious background, which Merseyside Police considered publishing on 31 July 2024. Chief Constable Serena Kennedy told us that this was being considered because of the negative impact that misinformation was having on Merseyside’s Muslim communities.23

11.The CPS told us that in the evening of 31 July, CPS headquarters was asked for advice on a press statement which confirmed the Southport suspect’s religion; the national CPS initially suggested, and later confirmed, that there were no concerns about this information being published.24However, as the CPS acknowledges, “simultaneous, fast-moving” discussions were taking place between Merseyside Police and the local CPS. The CPS states that “it was never suggested that this information risked prejudice to the trial”, while acknowledging that the local CPS had a “different view to the police as to whether this information should be released.”25

12.Chief Constable Kennedy provided more detail on the discussions with her local deputy Crown Prosecutor, which took place during what she described as a 90-minute discussion almost entirely about whether or not to disclose the suspect’s religion.26While the CPS stated that no specific advice was given that this information would be prejudicial, Chief Constable Kennedy stated that it was the “very clear view” of the local CPS that information about the religion should not be included, and moreover that this was “because of the impact on the criminal justice process.”27Chief Constable Kennedy told us that it was this “direction” which meant the information about the suspect’s religion was not published.28

Impact on disorder

13.Police forces told us, as the Home Office stated, that social media was a significant factor in the spread of disorder as it was used to disseminate information about protests and other action; however, the extent to which dis- and misinformation were a specific driver of disorder is not clear.29Chief Constable Kennedy was not able to say whether she thought publishing information about the suspect’s religion would have prevented further disorder, and told us that her main motivation in publishing the information was to try to protect Muslim communities, rather than to prevent disorder.30Moreover, Chief Constable Webster suggested that in Cleveland there was a significant amount of opportunistic participation driven by social deprivation, rather than social media:

Most of the people who came through Teesside Crown Court on the first day of sentencing had been out, had had too much to drink, had walked past and thought, “Why not?” That is not a representative sample, but much of that desperation, despair, lack of hope, lack of stake and nothing to lose certainly impacted on the disorder that took place in Cleveland.31

Impact on public trust

14.Whether or not the lack of disclosure helped to foment disorder, we heard that growing lack of trust in institutions overall, including the police, made it difficult to explain with credibility why certain information could not be released and enabled misinformation to take hold. Emily Spurrell, Merseyside Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) and Chair of the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC), told us:

When you are trying to go out and explain to the public […] why certain information is not being put in the public domain to protect that process [the judicial process], we were coming at it from a point where they did not trust what we were saying. [We] need to look at how we rebuild that trust in all the different sectors so people know that they are going to get the right service when they want it. Then when we do have to explain to them or make difficult decisions, they understand why that is happening.32

Assistant Commissioner Matt Twist of the Met and Chief Constable Harrington, NPCC lead for public order during the disorder, both agreed that there was a general lack of trust in institutions, including the police, and that this was creating a vicious circle where low trust enables disinformation and misinformation, which in turn can further undermine trust.33Chief Constable Harrington told us that neighbourhood policing was key to building trust.34

15.Chief Constable Kennedy told us that joint working between the CPS and Merseyside Police was regularised after July, with joint meetings taking place with the CPS, both nationally and locally, relating to communications in October and January about further developments in the case.35Despite this improvement, both Chief Constable Kennedy and the CPS acknowledged that the shared media protocol informing discussions of this nature, which was first published in October 2005, was not fit for the social media age.36The CPS stated that the revision of the guidelines, which is currently being finalised, will take into account several factors including the changing media landscape.37,38

16.Ultimately, both the CPS and Merseyside Police were limited by the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which restricts the publication of potentially prejudicial material in criminal proceedings. Prior to the murders of Bebe King, Elsie Dot Stancombe and Alice da Silva Aguiar in Southport, the Law Commission had been asked to review the law on contempt of court and consider whether any improvements could be made. On 3 March 2025 the Law Commission published a supplementary consultation paper to consider the issues relating to contempt of court which were raised by the Southport case, namely “whether there should be contempt of court liability for those who risk prejudicing a criminal trial by releasing information in the interests of public safety or national security.”39

17. conclusion
Merseyside Police were put in a very difficult position given legal restrictions on communicating the identity of the Southport suspect and the need to withhold certain information in order to protect the trial. The inconsistent advice from the CPS over the publication of information about the suspect’s religion was particularly regrettable and hampered the police response. It cannot be determined whether the disorder could have been prevented had more information been published. However, the lack of information published in the wake of the murders of Bebe King, Elsie Dot Stancombe and Alice da Silva Aguiar created a vacuum where misinformation was able to grow, further undermining public confidence. We respect the CPS’s commitment to minimising risks to successful prosecutions, but it is clear that neither the law on contempt nor existing CPS guidance for the media and police are fit for the social media age. We therefore welcome both the Law Commission’s supplementary consultation on contempt of court and the CPS’s review of media guidelines.

recommendation
Notwithstanding potential changes to contempt of court laws, we recommend that the CPS publish its new media protocol as soon as possible and keep this updated at least every five years or earlier if there is a significant change to the media landscape. It should also work with partner organisations in the police and media to ensure there is a clear shared understanding of its interpretation and use.

2Policing response to disorder

Summary of local policing responses

18.The response of individual police forces to disorder that took place in their areas necessarily differed depending on the nature of the events, so this report will not provide a comprehensive account of the police response in each force area. Nonetheless, we heard of several commonalities among the police forces we heard from.

19.Some instances of disorder began as apparently peaceful anti-immigration protests which meant that forces had to balance the need to facilitate the protest with contingency to respond if violence developed.40Chief Constable Harrington described how this meant that police forces had to make difficult judgements about how to police incidents, highlighting the example of what equipment police officers used:

That leads to some of the discussions that you will have seen about whether officers are in full code protective equipment or whether in normal duty. There is a fine balance for commanders and officers to say if we can talk our way in and engage it is much better.41

In some cases, for example in both Rotherham and Hull, counter-protesters were also present, which also required policing. Chief Constable Poultney described how counter-protesters required a police escort to leave the site as tensions escalated, while Chief Constable Heaton also described how police officers ended up “in the middle” of escalating tensions between protesters and counter-protesters.42

20.In addition, we heard that disorder developed rapidly. For example, Serena Kennedy, Chief Constable of Merseyside Police, described how on 30 July a group of approximately 70 people broke off from a peaceful vigil and moved towards the Southport mosque; violence began seven minutes after the group arrived at the mosque.43Similarly, Chief Constable Heaton described how the planned protest in Hull city centre on 3 August “quite quickly descended into disorder,” while Assistant Commissioner Matt Twist stated that “very shortly” after protesters gathered in Whitehall on 31 July, the group made a co-ordinated move to breach the conditions of the protest.44

21.This rapid escalation of violence led in some cases to police forces being overwhelmed. For example, Chief Constable Poultney stated that in Rotherham “it very quickly became apparent that [the initial allocation of police resources] was insufficient for us to be able to maintain safety at the location and our absolute priority was to protect life, to preserve the lives of people there, people inside the hotel.”45 Similarly, Chief Constable Noble described how the lack of prior warning of a protest in Tamworth meant that “for several hours police officers were essentially bearing the brunt of individuals trying to get into the hotel,” and were unable to engage in more dynamic policing tactics.46This was exacerbated by the fact that in several cases the violence was targeted towards certain communities; we further heard that in Tamworth on 4 August there was “a clear focus by the [protesters] on injuring officers and gaining access to the hotel,” including using “industrial fireworks, pyros, flares, smoke grenades and rubble”.47

22.Chief Constables Webster and Poultney described the risk assessment processes that police forces undertake. In Rotherham, Chief Constable Poultney told us that the assessment was based on a peaceful protest at the same site a year previously, as well as an assessment of intelligence and social media which suggested that a peaceful protest was planned.48Similarly, Chief Constable Webster described how the police consider factors such as social deprivation, crime levels, community tensions and events likely to drive disorder in the local area; he stated “there were no indicators […] to indicate tension that would lead to this level of disorder.”49

23.However, the report by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) into the events of the summer suggested that disorder could have been better anticipated, given recent examples of unrest, particularly the significant riot in Harehills in Leeds in July 2024.50Moreover, the targeted nature of the planned protests could itself be said to be non-peaceful; as one Sheffield City Councillor wrote in reference to the violence in Rotherham, “peaceful protests do not target marginalised communities, do not seek to intimidate; do not encourage arson and attempted murder.”51As well as this, by the time of the planned protest in Rotherham on Saturday 4 August, protests had already turned into disorder in several towns and cities including Southport, London, Hartlepool, Aldershot, Sunderland and Hull, and the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s National Mobilisation Co-ordinator had asked forces, on Thursday 1 August, to